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The ‘Possible’ Role of the Imagination in Philosophy and Theology 
 
This paper will examine Ludwig Wittgenstein‘s (1889–1951) idea that philosophy is a 
matter of the will more than of the intellect. This means that much of what we battle, in 
philosophy, is the propensity of so many to deceive themselves. It also entails that what, 
in effect, is to be offered as a cure is a therapeutic practice that, in its persuasive aspect, 
facilitates a gestalt-shift in which the imagination plays a central role. For, from the point 
of view of the person caught in self-deception, there is no reason to change; any reason 
must come from a partly different world-picture. Such a person must be persuaded to 
accept a different way of seeing things in the particular circumstances. Of course, this 
will appear artificial to the person and he will experience stumbling and hesitation as he 
lives in what, to him, is a more or less ‗foreign‘ way. However, it will, perhaps, not be 
long before living in such a manner becomes second nature to him so that he would have 
brought an appropriate quality of smoothness in his relation to the particular sector of 
reality. Hence, such a position would mean that a good number of obstacles and problems 
within philosophy are related to the manner in which we want to see things or, rather, to 
the manner in which we refuse to countenance otherwise. 
This paper will also attempt to show that, even within the arena of natural 
theology, while arguments, reasons, evidence, and the like, that are brought forward 
certainly do not lack pertinence, normally, one‘s belief in the existence of God is not, in 
reality, arrived at by deductive inference. 
The suggestion is that, whereas one world-picture may be seen to comprehend a 
wider range of experience better, and to a fuller degree, than another, one‘s ‗decision‘ 
plays a certain role in one‘s philosophical conversion; a person can refuse to occupy 
herself with reality under a given conception and make such a vision her own. 
As is well known, for Wittgenstein, achievement in philosophy, lies in striving to 
renounce to certain temptations to be beguiled by certain pictures in our superficial use of 
language. In this respect, the image of philosophy Wittgenstein developed was a clinical 
one. He held that there was a strong analogy between techniques of eliminating 
philosophical confusions and those of treating an illness. To a great extent, his 
philosophizing is a matter of fighting against certain unhealthy habits of thought that 
permeate the intellectual culture of a period, certain mythologies that infect a culture. 
These misleading pictures are merely passed over in silence in most of our practices, for 
they do not trouble us in practical life, when language is in use. Where they do cause 
problems is when language is idling and used theoretically by philosophers or by the 
 2 
philosopher within each one of us (and, most notably, by the scientist). Then, somewhat 
inevitably, one is dragged down by misunderstandings. One could here think of a scientist 
who is tempted to see ‗thinking‘ as being constituted by the firing of a number of 
neurones in a given sector of the cerebral cortex and goes on to carry out an investigation 
where he tells the subject to think more slowly to see what changes ensue in the patterns 
of neural firing. The problem, of course is whether such instructions make any sense at all 
within the context of the investigation; it is whether such a figurative representation of the 
concept – picturing thinking as similar to a physical process – is misconceived. Thus, 
treatment would mean changing the ways of thought and of life of the community or the 
individual. The therapy consists in activities like rearranging what is familiar, re-ordering 
in order to dissolve particular confusions,
1
 making patterns or aspects visible,
2
 and 
gaining acceptance for an alternative picture:
3
 ―[o]ur investigation tried to remove this 
bias, which forces us to think that the facts must conform to certain pictures embedded in 
our language‖.4 
Wittgenstein maintains that propositions describing a world-picture can be 
described as a kind of mythology.
5
 Such propositions and practices, usages, taboos and 
rituals, therefore, would manifest the views and convictions that characterize the form of 
life lived by a cultural community. They might contain traditions about the origins of the 
community and the genesis of the world; they might contain perspectives on seasonal and 
biological events, sanctions of political and cultural structures, exhortations to a particular 
type of religious belief, and all that underlies the life of a community. Such a world-
picture guides the behaviour and the decisions of those who hold it; it serves as a basis,
6
 
or a point of departure,
7
 of a way of looking at the world. Hence, the concept of ‗world-
picture‘ is used largely to describe the intuitive or practical dimension of the community‘s 
customs and institutions, or of one‘s life, customs, routine, and decisions, rather than the 
discursive dimension that has been worked out rationally. Once again, one cannot explain 
everything: at one point there is always that which is taken on trust, since, as Wittgenstein 
avers, ―I really want to say that a language-game is only possible if one trusts something 
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(I did not say ‗Can trust something‘)‖.8 For the certainties one has cannot be tested for 
within the practice itself, but can only be shown in one‘s way of doing things; within the 
practice, one works with such certainties without doubting them.
9
 
Within this world-picture one can speak of determining the truth, or of coming to 
know some fact. As it were, the Weltbild functions as a ‗logical receptacle‘ that enables, 
within its frame of reference, disputes about truth and knowledge. Here, one sees that 
―[g]iving grounds, however justifying the evidence, comes to an end; – but the end is not 
certain propositions‘ striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our 
part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game‖.10 The end is not an 
ungrounded proposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting.
11
 At the basis of the world-
picture lies not knowledge but praxis: ―My life shews that I know or am certain that there 
is a chair over there … - I tell a friend e.g. ‗take that chair over there‘, … etc. etc.‖.12  
Thus, when giving grounds comes to an end, what remains is the following: ―If 
someone asked us ‗but is that true?‘ we might say ‗yes‘ to him; and if he demanded 
grounds we might say ‗I can‘t give you grounds, but if you learn more you too will think 
the same‘‖.13  For one must begin to trust somewhere, that is to say: one must begin with 
not-doubting. And that is not, so to speak, hasty but excusable: it is part of judging.
14
 
At this point, ―[o]ne wants to say ‗All my experiences shew that it is so‘. But do 
they do that? For that proposition to which they point itself belongs to a particular 
interpretation of them. ‗That I regard this proposition as certainly true also characterizes 
my interpretation of experience‘‖.15 Or rather, it forms the way I see reality. For, 
experiences do not teach fundamental certainties. Rather they constitute just the ways in 
which one sees these experiences. One, as it were, swallows such certainties whilst one is 
learning various language activities. One can say that a world-picture is a form of 
imagining and experiencing the world that is assimilated as one‘s second nature. 
In this light, the problem against which philosophy perennially militates is what 
one is tempted to say and it can arise precisely because of unhealthy habits of thought and 
of ways of life in which we are enmeshed and that engender prejudices: 
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Human beings are profoundly enmeshed in philosophical – i.e. grammatical – confusions. 
They cannot be freed without first being extricated from the extraordinary variety of 
associations which hold them prisoner. You have as it were to reconstitute their entire 
language. – But this language grew up as it did because human beings had – and have – 
the tendency to think in this way. So you can only succeed in extricating people who live 
in an instinctive rebellion against language; you cannot help those whose entire instinct is 
to live in the herd which has created this language as its own proper mode of 
expression.
16
 
 
In doing conceptual analysis, it is important to note what it could mean to ―live in 
an instinctive rebellion against language‖. It is not that the philosopher stands outside 
language, examining it as a workman would examine his tools, as it were; language is not 
a skill that I may choose to use for such-and-such a purpose. Even if language does not 
have the kind of unity that belongs to a calculus, and one sees that language-games are 
different, language is the element within which we have our life and we cannot go outside 
it to tinker with it. Within language one can, however, stand outside of, say, the regime of 
mathematics, distancing oneself from that community in order to see what the temptations 
that mathematical language brings with it are. Of course one would be doing so, not as a 
mathematician, but as a philosopher. To be a philosopher, one must be amazingly 
sensitive to misleading modes of expression, sincere with oneself and courageous in one‘s 
thinking and acting. One must, above all, shun superficiality: 
[… I]n doing philosophy you have got to be ready constantly to change the direction in 
which you are moving. At some point you see that there must be something wrong with 
the whole way you have been tackling the difficulty. You have to be able to give up those 
central notions which have seemed to be what you must keep if you are to think at all.
17
 
 
The way out is to effect a reorientation of one‘s way of thinking; one must aim at 
a conversion to a partially new world-picture. The way forward is the persuasion of the 
individual to replace entrenched yet inadequate habits of thought by the possibility of 
other conceptions or pictures of the reality in question. 
This means that, in doing philosophy, one must overcome resistance of one‘s will; 
what makes something difficult to grasp may well be how one wants to see it.
18
 For, a 
world-picture must be accepted; it cannot be forced or coerced: ―I believe … am sure, by 
reason of what has been said to me, of what I have read, and of my experience. To have 
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doubts about it would seem to be madness – of course, this is also in agreement with 
other people, but I agree with them‖.19 One may always persist in refusing to see an 
aspect even if it is drawn to one‘s attention: the ―[d]ifficulty of philosophy [is] not the 
intellectual difficulty of the sciences, but the difficulty of a change of attitude. 
Resistances of the will to be overcome‖:20  
What makes the object hard to understand [is] the antithesis between understanding the 
object and what most people want to see. Because of this precisely what is most obvious 
may be what is most difficult to understand. It is not a difficulty for the intellect but one 
for the will that has to be overcome.
21
 
 
This transformation of one‘s way of seeing things may be extremely difficult even 
for someone who is highly intelligent. One can, for instance imagine how difficult it 
would be for someone to convince Gottlob Frege to drop his conviction that the 
possibility of objective knowledge in mathematics is grounded on number-concepts 
standing for abstract entities given directly to our reason. For this seems to form an axis 
for his thinking, something unshakeable or undoubtable that forms part of his intellectual 
identity. 
With respect to religious belief, the scenario is rather similar. For, it is important 
to note that, even here, many of one‘s beliefs are not, in reality, arrived at by deductive 
inference or argument, and are not in deed supported by any reasons in one‘s life. In the 
case of natural knowledge of God, for example, 
it isn‘t that one beholds the night sky, notes that it is grand, and concludes that … God 
exists. It is rather that, upon the perception of the night sky, … these beliefs just arise 
within us. They are occasioned by the circumstances; they are not conclusions from 
them.
22
 
 
In this sense, once again, one‘s ‗certainties‘ are manifested in, and shape one‘s 
perception, the way one sees things. They form and they manifest one‘s starting points for 
thought, the receptacle within which one thinks and acts. They are not accepted on the 
evidential basis of other beliefs, although, of course, one would cite various other 
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propositions in defence of one‘s beliefs if another were to challenge them. However, if 
the latter were to continue to push, in the end, one would simply have to reply that ‗one 
has to see it‘. Certainly, experiences of a certain sort are often intimately involved in the 
formation of one‘s belief in God; also one may see that specific beliefs comprehend a 
given situation or phenomenon better. However, typically such beliefs are not accepted as 
conclusions by way of some argument from experience. It is rather that the experience 
normally constitutes the occasion for the acceptance of the beliefs in question. It is 
interesting, here, that arguments, reasons, evidence, and the like, that are brought forward 
in natural theology, are created by believers who place themselves in the shoes of those 
who want to understand; they would not normally speak as though it might, after all, turn 
out that there is no god, but only investigate God‘s existence in terms of wanting to offer 
justifications or grounds for those for whom it is not a certainty in their lives, or even in 
order to explore better the relevance of God‘s existence in their own lives.23 However, 
even if such justifications or grounds could turn out to be actually useful in someone‘s 
coming to see that God exists, it is evident that what normally happens is that some 
situation or event convinces him or her to see things differently. 
What is so pertinent here is that such occasions manifest that the case of 
conversion is not solely a matter of ratiocination, it is also – and in the case of a belief, or 
an unbelief, in the existence of God this is typically the case, since belief, or unbelief in 
God is characteristically a commitment that shows itself in many of the agent‘s doings 
and sayings – a matter of ‗transcending‘ one‘s world-picture where one is persuaded and 
also decides to see things thus, under such-and-such a conception: he or she decides to 
make these connections between elements of reality. For, as has been seen, our way of 
looking at, and acting within, reality is not merely a matter of one‘s passively receiving 
stimuli and responding automatically. One‘s practical intellect is shaped in a certain way 
and this is shown in what one sees as pertinent, the way one speaks, and so on. Thus, 
certain certainties in one‘s life are in deed not doubted and remain open to so little serious 
questioning that they serve as hinges around which one‘s dealings with reality revolve. 
One would have assimilated them into one‘s way of life. I want to recall here that 
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Wittgenstein gives some telling examples of such assimilation manifested as one‘s second 
nature that are pertinent to this matter: 
Isn‘t this altogether like the way one can instruct a child to believe in a God, or that none 
exists, and it will accordingly be able to produce apparently telling grounds for the one or 
the other?
24
 
However, we can ask: May someone have telling grounds for believing that the earth has 
only existed for a short time, say since his own birth? – Suppose he had always been told 
that, – would he have any good reason to doubt it? Men have believed that they could 
make rain; why should not a king be brought up in the belief that the world began with 
him? And if Moore and this king were to meet and discuss, could Moore really prove his 
belief to be the right one? I do not say that Moore could not convert the king to his view, 
but it would be a conversion of a special kind; the king would be brought to look at the 
world in a different way.
25
 
 
What is somewhat startling is Wittgenstein‘s insistence that getting someone else 
to share one‘s certainty is closer to inviting her to occupy herself with a particular 
conception or aspect than presenting demonstrative evidence to justify a hypothesis. 
One also notes that, while ‗propositions‘ of one‘s world-picture cannot be 
imposed against one‘s will, it is possible to work – albeit hesitantly – within an alien 
conception or world-picture and make sense of problems, moves, strategies and solutions 
within it. This is interesting because it signals the freedom that marks our human ways of 
imagining, thinking, judging, and living and the requirement, incumbent upon us, of 
being imaginative, reflective, and critical within the midst of one‘s way of thinking and 
living. Such scrutiny is essential because it may well bring up hitherto unnoticed defects 
such as parochialism, bad prejudice
26
 and self-deception. 
Wittgenstein‘s point is that, while ‗decision‘ plays a certain role in one‘s 
conversion, one‘s coming to belief in God, like one‘s adoption of a change in one‘s 
world-picture, is not a decision taken once and for all; one can assimilate a change in the 
way one looks at, and acts within, a situation only through repeated, persistent effort. 
Notwithstanding this, the thrust of his method is that one can, to some extent, determine 
the aspect under which one sees some situation, or under which one occupies oneself 
unhesitatingly with a certain piece of reality. 
Now, it is not that there is no ‗truth‘ or ‗falsity‘. It is, rather, that a person can 
refuse to see something under a given aspect. She would have refused to occupy herself 
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with the situation under a given conception and make such a vision her own. In all this, it 
is not that the persuasion or sharing of one‘s world-picture is completely irrational and 
subjective. One gives reasons; only, one ends up with such reasons as say themselves; 
one ends up with the element in which one‘s arguments have their very life. Also, one is 
not saying that there is nothing objective about one‘s world-view. Wittgenstein continues 
On Certainty §92 by noting: 
Remember that one is sometimes convinced of the correctness of a view by its simplicity 
or symmetry, i.e., these are what induce one to go over to this point of view. One then 
simply says something like: ‗That’s how it must be.‘ 
 
This remark is interesting and important for one may well suspect that what has 
been said – that when one is dealing with a change in world-picture, one does give 
reasons even if it may well be that, at one point, one will have to invite or persuade the 
person to see the situation in this way rather than in another manner – entails some kind 
of fideism. Now, this is not the case. For, although one might firmly hold that one cannot 
be making a mistake about such-and-such, one may indeed, sometimes – rightly or 
wrongly – believe that one was not competent to judge.27 And this legitimate though, at 
the instance of admission, abstract critique of one‘s belief is contemplated further for 
Wittgenstein asserts that ―[i]f that always or often were to happen, that would indeed 
completely change the character of the language-game‖.28 Now this shows the way 
forward in terms that manifest that such persuasion is not fideistic for, indeed even if, on 
the one hand, our concepts are certainly moulded by our linguistic practices, on the other 
hand, ―it is always by favour of Nature that one knows something‖.29 I do want to stress 
that even if such a sequence of events, when one realizes that one was wrong where one 
could not contemplate being wrong, may occur albeit rarely, this does not exculpate the 
entire human business of assertion and denial from being within the space of reasons. For 
all our judgments and all challenges to such judgments always take place within the 
sphere of what is thinkable. At the same time, however, that one knows something is not 
guaranteed by the language-game: what is thought is open to criticism; indeed, a second 
world-picture may be seen to comprehend a wider range of experience better than the 
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first.
30
 The relation between what is thought and the provocations of reality will always 
be tentative but – while it does not break out of the sphere of thinkable content – it rests 
on features of the world that are independent of what is thought. Hence the standing 
obligation to be willing to refashion concepts and conceptions if that is what experience 
recommends. The inherent human vocation is to strive towards the network of rational 
linkages and justifications that comprehends experience better, and to a fuller degree. 
Of course, in the religious arena, there are some certainties whose role is 
untouchable if one is to remain within the particular religion. Nevertheless, there surely 
are also bad prejudices. The imagination – and the knowledge of the process of the 
transmission of tradition – can play a vital role here in the necessary critical reflection. 
Indeed, it is highly interesting that what has been said above for philosophy, and for 
natural theism, can also be said for theology. 
However, the imagination does not have a merely critical role. Since a world-
picture is a form of imagining and experiencing the world that is assimilated as one‘s 
second nature, where our imagination has a role in our coping with, shaping, and 
ultimately transforming the concrete world, it is highly significant that works of art and 
verbal expressions, which embody that which they depict or signify, are such an important 
arena for theology. Indeed, this significance does not only hold for efforts of ‗high‘ 
creativity – as it obviously does – but also for the daily and the ordinary. For, just as one 
may note the difference between saying, on the one hand, of someone ‗He behaves well‘ 
and, on the other hand, ‗He made a great impression on me‘31 – and such an experience, 
though objective, may not always live for the person, just as the portrait of a dear friend 
may not always ‗smile‘ for one while one is seeing it32 –, one notes a difference between 
one who lives life rather aimlessly and superficially and another who, as it were, imagines 
things with God.
33
 And here, just as it would be vastly reductive to claim that, for 
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example, the theological significance of a Gothic Cathedral lies only in the correctness of 
its style,
34
 it is important and significant to note that, in this regard, it is not merely the 
content of the situation that is of importance. What is clearly also central is the aesthetic 
experience that makes a great impression and invites one into a different way of 
awareness. This is another way of saying that a religious certainty, and particularly, the 
way in which it is lived in a crucial moment of the community‘s history, or expressed by 
a great saint, embodies its meaning so that it is irreducible and inexhaustible. Hence, on 
the one hand, it says itself: a great formulation of a religious certainty, or a great 
expression of faith – just like an artistic object – is unique and the feeling is that the 
slightest alteration within it or attempt to translate it into another form would rupture its 
meaning. On the other hand, however, in understanding such a certainty, one must 
explore the way in which it relates to its context and it is possible to say a great deal about 
this; indeed, this is an inexhaustible task since one discovers ever richer connections of 
meaning and significance within the life of those for whom it is a certainty. In a certain 
sense, the tie-ups with the certainty‘s surroundings can encompass the whole of life and 
these tie-ups need to be explored if one is to come to a better understanding of the 
meaning of the certainty itself and a greater appreciation of its unique irreducibility. 
                                                                                                                                                  
dimension. The rather surprising reply is a resounding ‗yes‘. For he insists that faith is based on ‗a narrative 
of signs‘ and that, in this light ‗metaphorical, symbolical and parabolical‘ approaches are not only 
acceptable, and not merely helpful but, indeed, necessary. As always it is intriguing to go through some of 
the objections and his replies in order to appreciate the context of the contrary view that he intends to 
undermine. In the second objection, the objector notes that, whereas the method of a science should be 
proportioned to the science itself – and theology is one to the greatest degree, and therefore the method of 
theology should also be unified to the greatest degree – nevertheless the theological method does not appear 
at all unified since it proceeds sometimes by making threats, sometimes by giving precepts, and sometimes 
by other methods. He pushes this further in the subsequent objection where the point is that, since theology 
as distinct from, say, poetry – which is said by the objector to contain the least amount of truth –, is a 
science to the greatest degree, it therefore should avoid the metaphorical dimension of poetry. The 
argument here is that poetry suffers from a defect of rational truth and, therefore, such a dimension or 
model is not fit for theology. His counter-arguments are, once again, an eye-opener. In response, he invites 
the second objector to see that theology addresses different publics. Where it is a matter of overcoming 
error (which does not constitute the whole of theology, he stresses), there it is clear arguments that are 
necessary: one must be prepared to give reasons (and, therefore, arguments) in order to satisfy all who ask 
for the reason of the faith that one has (see 1 Pt 3, 15; Thomas also quotes Titus 1, 9 to the same effect). 
However, he continues, theology is also involved in the contemplation of truth, and it is there that one needs 
a modus symbolicus that is not merely argumentative (Aquinas stresses this point further, in the body of the 
article, by noting that there are four levels of meaning in scripture: historical, moral, allegorical and 
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The Critical Spirit: Theology at the Crossroads of Faith and Culture, ed. Andrew Pierce and Geraldine 
Smyth (Dublin: The Columba Press, 2003), 200-207, for highlighting these passages. 
34
 See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief. 
Edited by Cyril Barrett. Compiled from notes taken by Yorick Smythies, Rush Rhees and James Taylor. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978, 8. 
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In this somewhat startling light, the final invitation to the writer and the reader 
hearkens both to critical reflection on one‘s traditions and prejudices, and to a sense of 
deep amazement, and readiness to investigate, reverently, elements in our life that say 
themselves, and that provoke the arising of philosophical and theological questions in the 
first place. 
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